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In a now famous essay, Ulf Hannerz suggested that we should look at our contemporary 
world as an ecumene; that is, as an undivided space of human intercommunication, a 
network of networks (1991).  A few years later, Sidney Mintz argued that, within this 
larger space, one can identify areas where intercommunication is more intense due to 
historical reasons – he famously suggested that the Caribbean too must be seen as an 
ecumene (1996).  A similar notion of areas of density of intercommunication that define 
humanity as historically constructed can also be found in Tolkien’s fiction writing, 
where the notion of ecumene played a centrally creative role – he called it ‘the middle-
earth’.   
In this paper, I argue that the sharing of a historical past functions as a catalyst 
for amity and, thus, within our globalised world Lusotopy (the space/time originating in 
the historical expansion of the Portuguese) shares the features of a ‘middle-earth’, an 
ecumene.  This is due not only to the sharing of a language, to the sharing of cultural 
codes, or of political and civic institutions; rather, the very choice of the concept of 
amity to characterise what makes Lusotopy emerge is meant to highlight the fact that, 
over and above these more perceptible features, we can find less immediately visible 
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features such as kinship networks, family histories, friendships, relations of homonymy, 
etc – all of those things that mark primordially our social personhood.1  
 
A catalyst for amity 
When I meet someone new, I invariably carry out a process of comparison of their 
condition to mine.  The first thing that happens is that I access what I share with this 
new person.  This involves an exercise in memory – do we speak the same languages, 
do we hold similar types of knowledge, do we have similar tastes, have we lived in the 
same cities, do we know people in common?  Although the process usually takes place 
subconsciously, I have found out that it makes for a peculiar intensity in the situation.  
The proof is that, if on a certain occasion one meets new people, one is prone to getting 
tired quicker.  Greater effort is involved in encountering new people than people we 
already knew. 
 The context of the meeting, however, matters immensely.  As a young man, I 
discovered that, in Johannesburg, South Africa, a person who had heard about my 
parents counted as a friend in the ethnically hostile environment of the Transvaal, where 
being Portuguese was, on the whole, a stigmatised condition.  Then, I went on to 
discover that, if I came across that very same person in a street in Lourenço Marques 
(present-day Maputo), where my parents lived, she would not greet me in the same 
effusive way.  Similarly, in England, a few years later, simply speaking Portuguese was 
a sufficient passport for being received as a friend in someone’s home.   
The point I want to establish here is that we approach people on the basis of who 
we are by relation to who they are – but context matters.  Thus, sharing a past somehow 
brings people closer and, depending on context, might even have the effect of allaying 
                                            
1 For this particular use of the concept of ‘primordiality’, cf. Pina Cabral, 2002b. 
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solitude in the way that Epictetus famously described when he said that finding oneself 
in the middle of a group of thieves while travelling abroad hardly reduces one’s 
solitude: ‘it is not the sight of a man as such that relieves us from being forlorn, but the 
sight of one who is faithful and self-respecting and serviceable.’ (2004 [1916], II: 24)  
Thus, I chose to speak of amity – a notion that Meyer Fortes placed at the root of 
kinship relations and Julian Pitt-Rivers extended to apply to close relations of 
neighbourhood and friendship (Fortes 1970; Pitt-Rivers 1973).  By using it, I mean to 
stress that what is at stake in these encounters is a process of interaction that is also a 
process of constant human co-construction, which is akin and associated with the 
processes of emotional constitution that characterise kinship and friendship.   
In his classical essay on the issue, Pitt-Rivers defines amity in the following 
terms: ‘All these “amiable” relations imply a moral obligation to feel – or at least to 
feign – sentiments which commit the individual to actions of altruism, to generosity.  
The moral obligation is to forego self-interest in favor of another, to sacrifice oneself for 
the sake of someone else.’ (1973: 90)  For us, however, today, this definition of the 
concept is problematic, as it bears the marks of the modernist conceptions which 
characterized the period of writing.  Today, we find ourselves obliged to re-work the 
concept of amity in order to avoid the implication that the self’s interests are in any way 
monadic and that, therefore, all ‘generosity’ sits on some sort of reciprocity between 
individuals (even if conceived in terms of Sahlins’ generalized reciprocity – 1972).   
Amity, thus, must be taken to remit to an extended notion of ‘fraternity’, of co-
responsibility, such as that which Emmanuel Levinas has proposed.  The philosopher 
warned us against the dangers of polarizing alterity.  He called our attention to the fact 
that the culturally elaborated categories of social belonging on which anthropologists 
have traditionally focused co-exist with another, far more constitutive, form of alterity: 
an interpersonal, face-to-face interaction that implies a deep and unavoidable sense of 
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ethic co-responsibility.  He warns us that ‘alterity [cannot] be justified uniquely as the 
logical distinction of parts belonging to a divided whole, which rigorous reciprocal 
relations unite into a whole.’ (1996: 165)   Modernist anthropologists focused on the 
latter type of alterity, thus forgetting about the former: the face-to-face confrontation, 
the basic fraternity that is constitutive of our own selves as humans.   
This basic fraternity is a precondition of all human sociality because it is 
constitutive of human beings, but it is constantly subject to the strains of political 
belonging: that is, to culturally elaborated forms of alterity.  Amity, in my view, must be 
taken to refer to the way in which humans construct themselves out of an essential drive 
for recognizing the humanity of others.  This process involves the channeling of one’s 
feelings of fraternity.  This is amity as constituted in kinship relations, friendship 
relations, ethnic belonging, etc. 
But let us return to the analysis of the unspoken claims hidden in the examples 
of Lusophone encounter that I started with.  I will provide two contrasting cases just to 
make my point.  W.V. Quine, the prominent Anglo-American philosopher, was a fluent 
speaker of Portuguese – indeed one of his very first books was published in Portuguese, 
in Brazil (1944).  Does this make him an instance of the Portuguese-speaking cultural 
contribution to contemporary philosophy?  Most people would think not.  Yet it might 
well have opened up the door of someone’s home for him in some distant context.  In 
fact, the eminent sociologist Hermínio Martins reports that, when the two met at a party 
in Oxford, they spoke amicably together at length in Portuguese.   
Now, the philosopher Spinoza was the son of Portuguese-speaking Jews residing 
in Amsterdam.  In his correspondence with Blyenbergh (2006 [1664]) he complains 
about not being able to debate philosophy in the language that he most feels as his own 
– which was, of course, Portuguese.  In fact, he was forced as an adult to learn Latin in 
order to be able to write his philosophical oeuvre.  Spinoza decidedly is part of the 
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Portuguese-speaking world and of the Portuguese cultural heritage in a way that Quine 
will never be.  But then why?  Don’t the Dutch have a better claim to him?  Don’t the 
Jews have a better one still, as he was Jewish – even although he had been ostracized?  
Or, since he made his living as a grinder of lenses, do the opticians have a greater right 
to claim his intellectual heritage? 
How did I come to pass so easily from the recognition of the sharing of a 
language to the ownership of a claim over a heritage?  Surely that was an abusive 
passage!  In fact, the examples I chose were meant to suggest just that.  Unfortunately, 
the issue is not so easily settled.  It is beyond doubt that, in a globalized world, the 
sharing of all that goes with a common language brings people together; makes them 
feel they share their fate; fosters mutual interest.  António Damásio, the famous 
neurophysiologist, has written a book about Spinoza where it becomes abundantly clear 
that the fact that the two of them share some association with Portugueseness is not 
irrelevant (2003).  And yet, I would not want to put into Prof. Damásio’s mind some 
sort of pathetic claim to national ownership of Spinoza’s oeuvre.  As a matter of fact, 
the sense that one gets from reading Damásio’s book is that what really mattered was 
not only that they shared a language or a culture (as the ‘national’ and the ‘religious’ 
issues are clearly beside the point in their case); rather, it was a combination of the 
language with a diasporic condition. 
Our perplexities can hardly be resolved by reference to linguistic norm.  What 
counts or does not count as Portuguese, strictly speaking, from some sort of normative 
linguistic standpoint is clearly not what is at stake here.  In other words, Spinoza’s 
relevance for our discussion is not affected by any debate concerning the precise nature 
of the dialectical variety of Portuguese that Amsterdam Portuguese Jews spoke in the 
late seventeenth century.  The proprietorial distortion that leads to the silly debate 
concerning who ‘owns’ Spinoza’s heritage is produced by a tendency to identify 
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automatically language with culture, culture with nation, nation with groupness – and 
we are lucky if our interlocutor does not go on to identify a people with a religion, for 
then we succumb to incurable confusion.  Part of the problem is the proclivity that we 
inherited from our modernist ancestors in the early twentieth century to discuss human 
interaction in terms that reify politically self-defined groupness – in anthropology, we 
call this kind of proclivity by the name that Émile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss gave to 
it when they advocated it, sociocentrism (1963). 
These kinds of doubts are especially poignant when diasporic situations are the 
order of the day.  And this is why I started this paper by giving examples of my own 
African experience.  These were situations where the fact that I was perceived as 
sharing something with these people made it more likely for us to create social trust in 
the midst of an essentially hostile environment, increasing the intensity of the 
intersubjectivity that arose during our encounters.  This thing we shared was a catalyst 
for amity, in the Fortesian sense (cf. Pitt-Rivers 1973).  But it was also the putty that 
brought Damásio to Spinoza in the throes of their mutual diasporas, or that produces in 
me such a feeling of intimacy when I read the book of Duarte Barbosa – the Nayar-
speaking clerk of the Cannanore factory (now called Kannur in Kerala, India), one of 
the greatest proto-anthropologists of the sixteenth century.2  
 
Error and irritation 
What is this thing, then?  Let us try it out a little.  Is it to do with sharing a common 
language?  I reckon it is not, since I have met people who do not speak Portuguese and 
yet whose relations to me give evidence of the presence of that catalyst for amity.  My 
experience with the Eurasians of Macao and Hong Kong and my contacts with the 
                                            
2 Barbosa 1984;  Reis 1948; Pina-Cabral 2007. 
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Timorese have left me with no doubt that one can feel distinctly the presence of this 
catalyst even among people who do not speak more than a few shreds of Portuguese (cf. 
Pina-Cabral 2002a). 
Is it then a ‘culture’?  Well, frankly, if Spinoza and Damásio are said to share the 
same culture only because they share this thing, then really the concept of culture has to 
be stretched to such a point that it means very little.  Damásio clearly shares much more 
concerning his definitions of the world with any contemporary Dutch person than with 
Spinoza.  Culture, then, also won’t suffice. 
I will go no further, as it has become clearly obvious by now that ‘nation’, 
‘group belonging’, ‘genetics’, ‘knowledge of historical facts’, etc., are all categories that 
will fare no better as exclusive terms for defining this catalyst for amity – even if they 
all, in fact, belong to the chain of associations that are normally presumed in the 
sociocentric tendency to conjoin language with culture, culture with nation, nation with 
group. 
There is, of course, the possibility of simply denying that it exists at all; 
claiming that I made a mistaken assessment concerning the sense of amity that I shared 
with those people; in short, that I am confabulating.  But I am hardly the first one to 
have noticed it (e.g. Sousa Santos 2001, Fry 2005).  So, for the moment, I will just take 
it for a fact that there is indeed some ‘thing’ out there the nature of which we have not 
yet quite determined.  It has often been noted that one of the best ways of starting an 
analysis is to test the notion through error.  Error is a wonderful tool for interpreting 
other people’s actions and their assumptions concerning the world more generally.  
Through it, we can start working at identifying the boundaries of operation of what we 
want to analyse. 
Now, in my own experience as a bearer of this Lusotopic catalyst, I have learnt 
to recognize a potential for misunderstanding in our exchanges leading to intense 
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mutual discomfort; a source of error in communication that is not always easy to 
pinpoint. For example, in Mozambique, I have learnt that my accent conjoined with my 
skin colour, function as irritants.  Somehow they have the potential to bring down my 
local interlocutors on first approach even although, in time, the old process of 
constitution of amity eventually prevails.  Then again, in Brazil, I have often been the 
butt of ethnicist jokes concerning the supposed stupidity of ‘the Portuguese’.  My 
interlocutors’ irrepressible compulsion to perform these jokes in front of me – patently 
not the illiterate migrant who impersonates the jokes – is a clear expression of their 
discomfort before me.  But there again, when faced with third parties, who somehow do 
not share this catalyst with us, the same Brazilians always give clear signs of its 
presence.  Again, in Portugal, when speaking about such matters, it is I who often feel 
irritated as I notice that my interlocutors are prone to presuming proprietorial claims to 
‘language’ and ‘culture’ that imply the subalternization of all the people around the 
world who share this catalyst of amity with us but who do not categorize themselves as 
‘Portuguese’.   
Over the years, I have learnt that these ‘errors’ have to do with that sense of 
‘claim’ that we identified above concerning Spinoza’s heritage.  It is a claim to 
privileged representation, to ownership rights – in it, cultural phenomena (custom, 
language, food, etc.) and political domination somehow conjoin.  One does not actually 
need to openly stake the claim before one’s interlocutors feel its effects; the 
isomorphism between language/culture/nation is so deeply ingrained into our 
presuppositions concerning the world that it is automatically presumed.  Its political 
corollary is that those who rule in the place where the language historically originated 
have greater claim to represent that language and, by implication, the groups which that 
language brings together.  Yet, in our post-colonial era, no one in their right mind would 
be willing to condone such a position, due to its imperialist and racialist implications.  
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In his theorization on these issues, Boaventura Sousa Santos rightly identifies these 
problems (2001).  Unfortunately, I feel that the ‘Calibanization of Lusophony’ that he 
proposes dehistoricizes the process, leading to the constitution of a kind of Lusophonic 
destiny that is inevitably utopian, even if, in taking recourse to the image of 
Shakespeare’s ugly Caliban, it presents itself initially as dystopian (cf. Pina-Cabral 
2004). 
It is, therefore, a fact of surprise to me that there is at the moment no way of 
referring conjointly to the space/time that is demarcated by the sharing of this catalyst 
for amity.  Lusophony as a term to describe those who hail from countries where 
Portuguese is the state language leaves out many people and places around the world 
where the catalyst’s presence is nevertheless very strongly felt: both (a) people who 
often do not speak Portuguese in Goa, Africa, Macao or Timor, and (b) people who, 
though they might speak Portuguese at home, live in worlds where other languages are 
dominant – Canada, the United States, Venezuela, South Africa, Australia, France, 
Luxembourg, Switzerland and Germany.  In fact, in Macao, Mozambique and Timor, I 
personally found out that affinity to a Portuguese football club is probably a far better 
marker of this shared sense of destiny than the actual capacity to use the Portuguese 
language (cf. Pina-Cabral 2002/3).  As I stated above, strictly speaking, sharing a 
language, sharing a culture or sharing a national identity will not suffice.  In fact, what 
to think of the sense of amity that a student of mine encountered when he went to 
Manchester to study Hindus whose ancestors originated in Diu, once a Portuguese 
colony, but who resided for various generations in Mozambique and then came to 
Europe, first settling in Portugal and then moving on to England?3 
                                            
3 I thank Nuno Dias for our long and interesting talks concerning his fieldwork 
experience. 
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Much as we might observe that the putty that brings together these experiences 
is not strictly speaking a linguistic one, there is a yet stronger reason why I prefer not to 
start with Lusophony as an adjective.  And that is, once we start to define a social space 
by a language, it becomes almost impossible to avoid the sociocentric convergence 
between language, culture and nation.  Lusophony surely is an important (I would say 
even central) aspect of the space that is delineated by the sharing of this catalyst for 
amity.  But if I refer to the space by the language, I inevitably fall into the type of 
proprietorial claim against which we were warned above.   
Therefore, I propose to characterize it as a space/time and not as a language.  I 
propose to adopt the word Lusotopy that the political historians from Sciences Po’ in 
Bordeaux invented and that they use as the name for their interesting journal. In short, 
to be part of Lusotopy is to possess the modes of identification/differentiation that are 
the key for entering into the network of relations that it constitutes.  Each one of us that 
possesses these modes of identification (that carries them in his or her past and signals 
them in a reified manner by his or her presence) creates a space/time by being part of it.  
So Lusotopy as a space/time affirms itself in its enactment.  This enactment occurs in 
the moment of recognition – that is, simply put, when two people that possess those 
modes of identification realize it by experiencing and assuming reflexively the 
operation of the catalyst for amity.   
Note, experiencing the identification does not necessarily mean to acknowledge 
the identification.  For example, I have encountered people who, for one reason or 
another, refuse to acknowledge openly the experience of identification.  It might be the 
case that they actually do not feel it – in which case Lusotopy has simply not occurred.  
But it has happened to me to have come out of such an encounter with the founded 
conviction that the people in question were in denial, to use the Freudian expression.  It 
has even occurred that, retrospectively, the person in question has later on 
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acknowledged the equivocation.  The situations of error which I exemplified above are 
typical instances were one’s presumed proximity functions initially in an almost 
perverse way as a factor for irritation.  One’s interlocutor’s irritation or his or her need 
to perform some sort of ritual of exclusion (of the kind exemplified by Portuguese jokes 
in Brazil) is already a sign that the catalyst is in operation. 
 
Ecumene 
Lusotopy, therefore, is not a contiguous space, nor can it be defined in any regional 
manner.   In short, so as to avoid the risk of confusing you any further, I propose that, in 
attempting to define Lusotopy, instead of relying on culture, language and nation and 
their presumed isomorphism, we should look to an earlier use of the concept of culture 
as expressed in the work of the American diffusionist anthropologist Alfred Kroeber.4  
He proposed that we should see these phenomena of cultural diffusion and the way in 
which they create a human world of intercommunication by using the Greek concept of 
oikoumenê (1963 [1923, 1948]: 231).  Today, the concept has become vulgarized by 
reference to the notion of ‘global ecumene’ which has been used more recently to 
describe the fact that the whole world today constitutes a kind of ‘network of networks’, 
to use Ulf Hannerz’s expression (1992: 34-58).  Much as this is a very important notion, 
I prefer to follow Sidney Mintz in believing that the concept can acquire greater weight 
if we take recourse to the earlier implications of the Greek word oikoumenê. 
The original word derives from the feminine present middle participle of a verb 
meaning ‘to inhabit’.  It was used literally to describe the part of the earth inhabited by 
humans.  The radical oikos refers to household (and specially the large room in ancient 
Greek homes where the women lived) and it points to the element of human fostering. 
                                            
4 I am grateful to Hermínio Martins and Wilson Trajano Filho for their insightful 
comments about these issues. 
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The usage of ecumene to mean the part of the world known to a civilization, which 
Kroeber espoused, further captures the Christian sense that the word has acquired since 
then, when used to describe the whole and most widely defined community of the 
Christians (as in the adjective ‘ecumenical’).   
My favourite, however, is the use that Tolkien gives to the concept by defining it 
as ‘the abiding place of men’, ‘the physical world in which man lives out his life and 
destiny, as opposed to the unseen worlds, like Heaven or Hell’.5  The synonym he 
ultimately adopts in his fiction writing is ‘middle-earth’, a translation of the Old English 
expression middangeard of which he declares that it ‘is not my own invention. It is a 
modernization or alteration ... of an old word for the inhabited world of Men, the 
oikoumenê’’.6 
The concept is useful to us, because it points to the existence of levels of 
convergence that exist within a much more broadly conceived sociocultural universe.  
Thus, we can speak of areas of global integration and areas of local specificity.  The 
middle-earth or ecumene is that area where struggle, construction and destruction occur 
which allows for human co-construction.  It is the area of human action.  In that sense, it 
is an area of relative freedom; it allows both for a certain freedom from local constraints 
and a certain freedom from global hegemonic imperatives.  To that extent the ecumene 
is a space of escape – it is the ‘discoveries’.   
It should be noted that I specifically want to avoid any similarity with the 
opposition in Canonical Law, which Mary Douglas made famous as a principle of social 
organization (2001), between modality (the local organization of the Church in terms of 
parishes and dioceses) and sodality (task-oriented non-local religious organizations) – 
                                            
5 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oikoumene. 
6 Tolkien (1995 [1981]): Letter 211.  
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that is the difference between local allegiances and transversal non-local allegiances.  
This will not serve our purposes.  Whilst Lusotopy functions as a sodality in as much as 
it links people across nations and continents; at local level, it is often the very historicity 
of the reified Lusotopy that gives rise to a localised sense of community.  I believe 
Timor Leste is probably the best example of how a distant historical Lusotopic ferment 
can function as the basis for a future-oriented project of national community (cf. Feijó 
2008).  Many other examples would be found throughout Asia, from the Catholic 
communities of Larantuka in Solor Islands, to Catholic communities in India, to the 
burghers of Sri Lanka, to the Kristang of Malacca, to the Eurasian middle-class of 
Macau and Hong Kong that I studied in the 1990’s (cf. Pina-Cabral 2002a). 
Our tendency to focus on colonial history from the Eurocentric perspective of 
power and rule means that we have not developed sufficiently our analytical language 
for dealing with the way in which, in the long term, colonial encounters write 
themselves into people’s worldviews in ways which open the way for new negotiations 
of self-respect and self-determination.  Elizabeth Traube, in her superb ethnography of 
the Mambai of Timor Leste, carries out a study of the way in which colonial rule wrote 
itself into Timorese myth, giving rise to complex processes of 
identification/differentiation (e.g. 1986: 55).  As she puts it, ‘Strictly speaking, Mambai 
have no tradition of foreign invaders from the outside, nor do they have any real 
conception of a larger outside world which might encompass their own society.  By 
Mambai theories of origin, the Malaia [a category which includes all non-Timorese] are 
autochthonous, their relationship to the Timorese is based on kinship, and their arrival 
on Timor signifies the return of the legitimate defenders of order.’ (1986: 53).  
Decolonization was formulated to the ethnographer as ‘this matter of our younger 
bothers going away.’ (1986: 54). 
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Now, a process such as this one is local and unique and cannot be observed in 
any other Lusotopic space/time.7  Still, each of these local charters of 
identification/differentiation, when looked at from a distance, comes to constitute a 
foundation (local, diversified and irrepeatable) for an ecumene that, in contrast, is a 
function of globalization.  Paradoxically, this is the case even when, as it happens with 
the Mambai, there is no local category to formulate the larger outside world. 
In reaching this formulation, I was influenced by the use given to the concept of 
ecumene by Sidney Mintz.  What unites the Caribbean, he argues, cannot really be 
pinned down to language, custom or nation (including, of course, ethnicity) – for these 
were all very varied in the region. And yet, in spite of all that, the Caribbean has a 
distinct ‘coherence not so much cultural as sociological.’ (1996: 289)  Thus, he sustains 
‘The basis for constructing a Caribbean oikoumenê, then, lies with the social 
frameworks created for culturally diverse migrant people who were subjected to 
century-long processes of mostly forced cultural change by European rulers; and 
with the long-term effects of those processes upon Caribbean life.  It has nothing 
to do with language or food or dress or like cultural indices as such, but with a 
transmuted vision of the world itself, engrafted upon countless strangers, who 
came or were brought to the region over the centuries, replacing those who had 
died or who had been killed off by disease, war and European imperial 
enterprise.’ (1996: 297) 
                                            
7 Even though, as the American historian K. David Jackson has noted, something 
like this loop effect could be found in the obsessive search for Christian roots in exotic 
places that characterized the Portuguese expansion in the sixteenth century (Prester 
John, the tomb of St. Thomas, the Nestorians in Mendes Pinto, etc.). ‘In abstract terms, 
to identify oneself with the lost origins means to assimilate being with its own absence.  
One might say that the Portuguese navigated in order to reach their own “lost” bodies, 
thus completing themselves.” (1997: 17) 
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Now, obviously, I am not claiming that Lusotopy as ecumene has the same 
history, the same process of construction, or the same regional type of reach as Sidney 
Mintz’s Caribbean.  It shares a similar condition, however, in that it operates as a kind 
of ‘middle-earth’.  Lusotopy is something that most of us that belong to it can identify 
when it arises.  Being spread out throughout the world, it is not a region but a 
space/time.  I favour the spatial metaphor for the sole reason that it marks better 
Lusotopy’s proneness to call onto itself by encompassment those who come close to it. 
My point is simple: as an ecumene, Lusotopy is a network of contacts; but, when 
it fires up, it creates effects upon the world; thus, it leaves reified marks (cities, statues, 
modes of cuisine, musical styles, manners and etiquettes, narratives and texts, language 
games, etc.); so, the world feeds back the ecumene onto those who produce it.  Thus, the 
ecumene is triggered off, as it were, by the reified products of its former occurrences, 
even when one is alone.  When this happens, the dispositions of identification within the 
single person involved are deepened and reinforced, predisposing this person to greater 
ulterior recognition.   
For example, I go to a foreign land, Sarajevo, at a time in which a violent civil 
war is brewing up and everyone around me is, as it were, fevered up by a sense of 
foreboding (1988).  In a museum, I start reading a liturgical text written in Serbo-
Croatian alphabetical style in a beautiful silver mounting.  As I pronounce it out loud, I 
discover that it is a Serbo-Croation rendering of Portuguese Jewish prayers – although it 
looks like Serbo-Croat, in fact it reads out as an archaic sounding Portuguese.  The 
experience grabs my breath with a poignant identification that brings me close to tears.  
I will never forget it again for it disposed me to look at Sephardic history in a new 
Lusotopic manner.  Thus, unwittingly, at that moment, I became an agent of the 
Lusotopification of Sephardic history.  Much the same sort of movement that results 
from Damásio’s approximation of Spinoza’s hideouts in Rijnsburg near The Hague. 
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Let me give you another example.  You will pardon that these are personal 
examples but they are useful precisely because of that – as I can report on the internal 
emotional dynamics that they produced which, in other people, would have remained 
relatively obscure to me.  The process is not unlike that of Freud’s reliance on the 
analysis of his own dreams or of his own reaction to Austrian jokes concerning Jews. 
Long ago, the economic historian Rui Graça Feijó and I were invited to go to a 
conference at the University of California, Berkeley.  In the weekend that followed it, 
we decided to rent a car and visit Yosemite Park.  It was spring and the tops of the 
mountains were still covered in snow.  So we drove as far up as we could and, when we 
reached the snowline, we parked facing the abyss, looking at that tremendously 
beautiful spectacle of the Park’s central valley.  Rui commented that, at that moment, he 
was as far from home as he had ever been.  After a moment’s silence, I switched on the 
radio and we nearly jumped off our skins.  The radio blurted out an advert in Portuguese 
for a healer, a certain Irmã Ana, who was specialised in making love potions, in allaying 
envy and in curing all sorts of ailments of the body and the soul.  Anyone who knows 
California is familiar with the existence of large communities of Portuguese residents in 
the nearby San José Valley, but for us at the time this worked almost as a Lusotopic 
epiphany, making us acutely conscious of the inescapability of our condition.  Irmã Ana 
promoted love as much as she safeguarded against envy.  She did this in Portuguese; 
thus firing up Lusotopic associations within a kind of middle-earth: an area both of love 
potions (and, therefore, inmarriage) and of envy (and, therefore, fraternal strife).  
Tolkien’s middle-earth as a metaphor is useful here, therefore, for it stresses the issue of 
human habitation, a sense that this is an area of action and of struggle; of friendship and 
of hate. 
Lusotopy’s strange inescapability is largely produced by the way in which one’s 
subject condition is dependent on one’s insertion into chains of historical events, 
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making one prone to recognize the people whose past went past those same events.  In 
this sense, Lusotopy is a continued identity – it is a proneness to recognize in others a 
certain kind of proximity caused by a common past (cf. Pina Cabral 2003).  Note, the 
strangeness of the feeling is created by the imposition of a number of veils.  
Descendents of former enemies find themselves mutually comforting against their own 
expectations; national foes find themselves sharing an unstated common ground when 
faced with third persons; people whose trajectories are ethnically divergent find ground 
for silent common recognition.  As Oswald de Andrade said for Brazil ‘only 
anthropophagy unites us’ – the struggles of the past bring people together in the present 
(cf. Pina-Cabral 1999). 
Particularly strange is the feeling of pride that people experience in the face of 
past events that, officially, are often held to be disreputable: empire, slavery, war, 
migration, hunger, religious fanaticism, dictatorship, etc.  Ever since the eighteenth 
century, the Lusotopic subject has lived a strangely dual condition: whilst being part of 
imperial nations, he or she is also subaltern in geopolitical and economic terms.  Brazil 
inherited from Portugal this same sense of being both modern, Western and imperial 
and, at the same time, backward, impoverished and dominated.  Faced with the Anglo-
American hegemonic alliance that has ruled the world since then, the subjects of 
Portugal, Brazil and their ex-colonies were ever placed before a dilemmatic identity 
which made up for a type of hurt pride.  Lusotopy, thus, when faced with Anglo-
American might (cultural, economic, political or military) is often experienced as a 
stigma. 
In these past post-colonial fifty years, the children of the Portuguese and the 
children of the former subjects of the Portuguese empire have found themselves in a 
global atmosphere where their continued identity is not seen as a source of prestige but 
mostly of a lack of prestige.  This gives rise to both anger and shame, both rejection and 
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repression, both fascination and enforced oblivion.  I know of successful intellectuals, 
third-generation descendants of non-European upper-class Portuguese-speaking 
families, whose whole privileged globalized lives have been spent struggling with the 
phantoms caused by the sense of Lusotopic identity that they do not manage to shed. 
Now, if we learn Erving Goffman’s lesson, we can detect the logic of stigma in 
operation – the process that often makes the stigmatised their own worse enemies; 
fraternity breeding love as well as hatred (1974).  As a young man in Transvaal, I 
witnessed the arrival of the refugees from the African colonies in 1976.  These were 
hordes of disoriented people who had been unprepared for their eviction by a totally 
backward and irresponsible colonial regime.  The prosperity of the late colonial period 
had turned these people, nearly all of whom had left Portugal in relative penury, into a 
rising middle-class.  Overnight, however, they were disowned and exiled.  To witness 
the scenes of abuse, pillage and maltreatment that were impersonated against them by 
many of the already settled Portuguese migrants that lived in South Africa, was an 
experience that I found deeply troubling and that probably goes into explaining why, 
over thirty years later, I am concerned with this topic to the point of writing this essay. 
Again, in southern France, one evening, my parents and I were being served at a 
restaurant by a young lady who, after the meal was ended and there was no one else left 
in the restaurant, declared that she was Portuguese.  The language that we had been 
speaking among us beckoned to her; it was deeply written into her as an emotional bind 
much as she could no longer express herself adequately in it.  Worse still, much like the 
children of Japanese migrants to Brazil who face a stigmatised condition when they visit 
Japan (Tsuda 2003), what she spoke was a garbled style of Portuguese that she had 
learnt from her illiterate parents; a parlance that she felt demeaned her.  The moment we 
acknowledged her as familiar and spoke to her in Portuguese, she found her own 
process of ethnic passing into Frenchhood challenged.  As she tried to explain to us in 
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her faulty Portuguese what she felt, she broke into tears and sobbed uncontrollably.  She 
was challenged not by us but, as it were, from within. 
 
Lusotopy and Diaspora 
At this point, you might well point out that whilst I often manage to identify the vague 
historical links that go into making Lusotopy, the bearers of those links themselves are 
often ignorant of their presence and nature.  Immersed as they are in universes of 
everyday life that feel locally integrated, they cannot tell which aspects demonstrate a 
Lusotopic ascent and which do not.  What, then, makes Lusotopy a middle-earth, a 
world of human habitation?   
The question is legitimate in as much as each of these bearers of Lusotopy are 
also the bearers of many other types of links; some of a local nature, but others of a 
global nature.  For example, members of my generation born in China, Africa, Brazil, 
America or Portugal, independent of whether or not they are bearers of Lusotopy, are 
capable of singing out to you the starting words of ‘Yesterday’, the Beattles’ song.  So 
what is special about Lusotopy by contrast to Beattlemania?  Well, the answer is that 
the difference is not one of essence but one of relevance.  As opposed to  Beattlemania, 
Lusotopy is far more constitutive of people’s everyday universes.  In short, when two 
bearers meet, they find echoes in each other that make them mutually recognizable and, 
in that way, that allow for greater and easier contact.  This does not necessarily mean 
that these people will immediately, due to it, become ‘friends’.  The notion of amity 
with which I have been operating does carry that ultimate meaning of mutual docility, 
but it hardly implies constant and absolute agreement.  Fraternal fights, as we have 
known since Cain, are the most homicidal (cf. Pina Cabral 2005 and Finkielkraut 1997).  
That ultimate sense of docility to which I refer is hardly an emotional disposition of 
each bearer individually.  It has to do with the fact that we are all socially constructed – 
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all humans were created by humans in a process of gradual evolution that is lost in the 
infinitesimal nature of the intervening steps.   
In order for us to become people, we had to link up into a series of meanings 
that were created long before each one of us came into existence.  That process of 
linkage is a process of acceptance, of docility in the face of the meanings of others.  
That original docility, however, need not be interpreted to mean that we are all easy 
going, nice sort of fellows.  To the contrary, all it means is that the very process of 
becoming human has involved us in negotiated meanings.  Pastness, therefore, is written 
into our condition as humans in such a way that we are all historical.  Thus, when a little 
baby in Brazil babbles her first words, those words produce echoes that reverberate 
throughout the world and that give rise to harmonies wherever there is Lusotopy.  These 
harmonies, we have seen, might not even be all that conscious to those who experience 
them and, in turn, reproduce them.  Never mind, because the whole process, whilst 
being human, is one that goes on in the world outside (or better still beside) humans.  It 
is in this sense that Lusotopy is an ecumene – a world of human habitation with 
characteristics of its own when compared with others.  Not always the same 
characteristics everywhere; not always with the same intensity; not always as tightly 
bound to each other.  But then, as I never claimed that Lusotopy is a sharply delineated 
territory, but rather that it is a loosely defined space/time that comes into existence 
whenever it occurs, we need not be troubled by the impossibility of drawing it out 
precisely on a world map.  But, of course, there is no problem in attempting to draw out 
on a map the areas of its strongest ocurrence.  In short, it is a statistical, not a mechanic 
event. 
As an ecumene, therefore, Lusotopy is the network constituted by a continued 
identity that originated in the Portuguese expansion of the sixteenth century but that 
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along the sea routes.  It is possible to trace the musical style that accompanied the 
Portuguese expansion all the way along the south Atlantic and into the Indian Ocean 
and, beyond that, to Malacca and into what is today Indonesia and beyond to Macau (cf. 
Jackson 1990).  The mutual and multilayered process that created these musical 
affinities and prolonged them over the next five centuries no longer has a single 
direction.  The local musicians that carry this musical line of descent are generally 
unaware of the web of links that their interiorized musical practice transports.  When the 
Singalese modernizing youth of the 1970’s rocked and danced away at the sound of 
what they thought to be the latest thing in modern chic (baila), they hardly could know 
that they were building on musical resources that this web of Lusotopic music had 
provided for them. 
In short, their music is written onto the world with implications that far outreach 
them.  But once inscribed in the world, their music produces echoes and triggers off 
recognitions (nostalgias, memories, traumas) that the musicians had not planned for.  In 
this way, a musical gesture produced with one set of localised personal aims, gets to 
echo somewhere else.  In some places, it gives rise to sheer disharmony.  Many have 
been the people who have twisted their noses at Singalese Lusotopic rock or at the 
Macanese tuna’s music or at the folkdancing of the Malacca Kristang – for those people 
Lusotopy did not occur.  But, unbeknownst to those who produce those musical 
gestures, there will be a lot of other people around the world for whom the very same 
echoes produce Lusotopic chords, so to speak. 
You will excuse me for using musical metaphors to speak about music, but I 
hope the point has been taken that the way Lusotopy is inscribed in the world operates 
largely independently of the actors.  Through human action, Lusotopy is reified; and, 
once that occurs, it becomes a mould for human action.  It does not constrain, it entices 
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– and that is why I do not speak of cultural domination, of acculturation or anything of 
the kind, but of echoes that give rise to harmonies. 
As with musical styles, much the same applies to the present day descendents of 
the naval creole that installed itself round the world in the sixteenth century or, for that 
matter, of the basic cooking methods that, adapting themselves to different foodstuffs 
and condiments, can still be seen in operation from Portugal to Brazil, from there to 
Africa and on to Asia, all the way to Macau’s Macanese food and Japanese tempura or 
castilla cake. 
More puzzling still, and for that reason yet more mysterious, is the way in which 
certain traditions of religious entertainment based on the Charlemagne crusading 
tradition, mediated by Jesuit theatrics, survived throughout the centuries to our present 
day – from São Tomé’s txiloli studied by Paulo Valverde (2000) to the cavaladas 
sertanejas that Isaura Pereira de Queiroz identified.  They ring out their Lusotopic 
chords in contemporary major works of literature and film such as Ariano Suassuna’s A 
Pedra do Reino.  Another fascinating example are the Congadas – a performance which 
celebrated the crowning of the King of Congo (the last case of African royalty that the 
Portuguese of the sixteenth century still treated as aristocratic equals before imperial 
attitudes set in).  This had a long history as an annual celebration of self-value among 
slaves throughout the Portuguese seventeenth and eighteenth century empire.  In Brazil 
and São Tomé, today, they re-emerge as an art form in a process of constitution of black 
pride strongly influenced by contemporary media culture and by Anglo-American 
modes of racial validation.  
There are too many examples like these for it to be worthwhile to continue.  The 
ones to do with music and dance or with language and literature are probably the most 
visible and striking, but I would not like to leave you with the sense that it is all to do 
with ‘culture’, ‘language’ and ‘literature’.  There are many ecumenical phenomena in 
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other areas: food and drink; legal practice; business dispositions; etc.  Where such 
things go deeper, however, is precisely where they are less easy to formulate.  Peter Fry 
has shown the way that the dynamics of racial differentiation are structured by long 
term Lusotopic trends (2005).   I myself have argued that the Lusotopic traditions of 
anthroponymy transport dispositions concerning the construction of the human person 
(2008). 
 
Lusotopy in Portugal 
Considering the drift the argument has taken, you might well ask yourselves whether 
Lusotopy is something strictly to do with exile and diaspora.  In short, is it something 
that necessarily occurs outside of Portugal? 
No; Portugal is as much part of it as anywhere else.  I have two seemingly 
contradictory replies to this question.  The first is that exile and diaspora are in Portugal 
too.  Today, the large cities in Portugal are terrains of Lusotopic colonization.  The 
second is that the Portuguese in Portugal have always been the bearers of two 
interconnected but distinct kinds of sociocultural strains: one, linking them to Iberia, 
southern Europe and the Catholic world as heirs to the Roman Empire; the other, 
linking them to the Atlantic world they were forced onto through economic need and 
political pressure (cf. Pina Cabral 2002/3).   
This issue links up with the question of misplaced proprietorial claims.  This is, 
in fact, a problem inherent in the initial use of the notion of ecumene.  At the beginning 
of last century, Kroeber writes, for example, that the concept has ‘a modern utility as a 
convenient designation of the total area reached by traceable diffusion influences from 
the main higher centres of Eurasia at which most new culture had up to then been 
produced.’ (1963 [1923]: 231)  This directionality of ecumene deserves our attention.  
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One of the reasons why I favour Mintz’s treatment of the concept is that he actually 
avoids this colonizing implication. 
To put the issue plainly, is it not true, after all, that it was the Portuguese 
‘discoveries’, as it were, that opened up Lusotopy?  Can we, thus, speak of Lusotopy 
without presuming the directionality (the one way movement) that this historical 
process implies?  Linear time produces directionality in sociocultural influence.  The 
thing with linear time, however, is that it is never the only temporal mode; other modes 
of temporality always interplay with it.  In short, Lusotopy was not instituted in Brazil 
the moment that Pedro Álvares Cabral arrived there, but rather the moment that the 
famous letter writing by his pilot, Pedro Vaz de Caminha, reached the king back in 
Lisbon.  Empire is created in an expansion outwards, but the historical implications of 
what it sets up are always dependent on a dialectics of return, as is apparent from the 
work of all the major sixteenth century Portuguese traveller scholars. 
The only problem for us today is that Portugal gives the feeling of being 
unchanged.  This is a mirage caused by cultural hegemonies that far outreach the 
influence of the Portuguese elite itself.  Portugal’s role as the point of origin does not 
imply by any means that it stands outside of its creation; as an unchanged elementary 
core.  No such thing happens in history and that has never actually been the case.  For 
example, the registers of the Inquisition studied by Laura Mello e Souza bear patent 
evidence to the fact that, ever since the sixteenth century, the religious and moral life of 
the Portuguese was being marked by the cargo of the return trip, the counter waves of 
Empire (2005 [1986]).  One of the ways in which this mirage of a pristine unchanged 
condition is fostered is by associating Portugal and things Portuguese with the other axis 
of sociocultural foundation of Portugal – the European axis, which we are prone to call 
Western these days. 
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For instance, we are ready to see how people like Matteo Ricci or Tomás 
Ribeiro went from Portugal and Italy to China, there to implant notions of neo-
Aristotelian philosophy and European music making.  At the same time, we fail to see 
what came in the Jesuits’ baggage in the return trip.  Leibnitz, for example, invented 
binary mathematics after having read a description of the Chinese notion of Dao by a 
Portuguese Jesuit (1994).  Binary mathematics, that which made the computer 
revolution possible is strongly considered a Western thing!  Here is the hegemonic 
mirage at work hiding the return trip.  We cannot write directionality out of the 
ecumene, but we can write the counterdirectionality back onto it. 
When we do that, suddenly, we start seeing things that were invisible earlier on.  
For example, over the past ten years or so the best fiction writing in Portuguese has not 
come out of Brazil or Portugal but out of Africa.  We might, thus, be tempted to claim 
that the two seats of Lusophony have lost their nerve, have exhausted their genius and 
that the newer communities are showing their vigour.  This, however, would be to miss 
the point that, in our present post-colonial world, Lusotopic literature is written in a 
kind of delocalized space that reflects the globalization of the lives of the inhabitants of 
our modern metropolises.  The point is not one of directionality, but one of increasing 
transnationality. 
I will conclude again with a personal note, the same way I started this paper.  
Between Sintra, where I live, and Lisbon, where I work, lie the most populous areas of 
contemporary Portugal, where the average age of the population is lowest.  As the train 
descends from the old town to the plain, it fills up with young people giving the outward 
signs of a multiplicity of origins – Guineans, Ghanaians, Angolans, Mozambicans, 
Brazilians, Moldavians and Ukrainians, even the odd ethnic Portuguese.  Chinese and 
Indians do not use this train, as they have settled in better residential niches on the 
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Eastern side of town.  I normally go in their midst during pick hour traffic and have 
little occasion to break through the routine of our daily trips.   
The other day, however, I made the journey back home on a Saturday afternoon.  
To my surprise the train was full.  At that time, only those whose families do not own a 
car are to be found there, so there was not a single ethnic Portuguese to be seen apart 
from me.  People were returning home from their Saturday shopping sprees, the train 
smelled of perfume and the dress code was one step up from usual.  Some of the people 
around me where replying to their cell phones in Russian or in Capeverdian creole.  The 
majority of them, however, had brought Portuguese with them from wherever they 
came initially.  They are busy writing into this land their own brands of spoken 
Portuguese as well as their music, their graphic styles, their skin colour.  The sense of 
Lusotopy struck me deeply.  For someone like me, who started life in the diaspora, the 
experience caused a feeling of warmth and well being, a certain aura of freedom; for 
others, who still hold desperately onto the proprietorial mirage, the sense of amity that 
they cannot fail to experience, produces a feeling of fraternal anger, a fear of loss of 
one’s mother’s love.  Racism, ethnocentrism and class exclusivism exist in Portugal, of 
course, as they exist anywhere else where there are human beings.  In Mozambique, in 
Brazil and in Macao such things can also be observed.  Lusotopy, therefore, is as much 
a terrain of encounter as of mutual fear and distrust.  As an ecumene, one thing 
Lusotopy is not: a utopia. 
In fact, my fervent hope is that we succeed in abandoning the modernist 
propensity for thinking the future by means of utopias.  Utopian thought, by attempting 
to escape history, encourages a kind of blindness to the unfathomable richness of 
history.  When history inevitably touches the plans of action drawn along utopian 
modes, it does so in ways no one could have predicted.  People are not prepared for the 
complexity and depth of the encounter and react in fear, producing monstrosities.  In 
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this sense, much as we have to allow ourselves to be inspired by the great visionaries of 
Lusotopy – António Vieira, Fernando Pessoa, Agostinho da Silva – we have to avoid 
their utopianism if we are to produce in the twenty first century a more humane world 
than that which we produced in the last century with its poisonous dreams of perfection. 
 
Conclusion 
Before closing off the argument, I would like to refer back to another implication of 
Tolkien’s notion of middle-earth.  He says that, in his fiction, the oikoumenê is in the 
middle ‘because [it is] thought of vaguely as set amidst the encircling Seas and (…) 
between the ice of the North and the fire of the South.’  I want to argue that Lusotopy 
shares much the same fate.  In our globalized world, it is neither Western nor non-
Western – it places its subjects in a middle-earth between today’s rich North and 
today’s highly diversified South.  I believe that this condition will become increasingly 
important in the coming years when the unifocal world we lived in since the Fall of the 
Berlin Wall will again polarize politically and culturally.   If in the past this condition 
has often proved to be a disadvantage for Lusotopic subjects; today, Agostinho da 
Silva’s suggestion that we should own up that condition as a middle-earth might well 
turn out to be useful. 
 This paper was an effort at inserting old concepts into new frameworks.  The 
sociocentric framework which presumes the unitariness of identity and sees all alterity 
as essentially dyadic is no longer satisfactory to most of us; but anthropological theory 
has not taken the sufficient steps to salvage some of its central concepts (concepts of 
immense theoretical might, such as amity or ecumene) from the sociocentric 
interpretations that were written into them by the modernists.  It is Kroeber’s and 
Tolkien’s humanist preoccupations that allow for their concept of ecumene to rise above 
diffusionism or medievalist nostalgia, respectively, making it decidedly useful to 
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understand our contemporary world, where the unitariness of cultures, societies or 
individuals is no longer self-evident. 
 
  29 
 
References 
Barbosa, Duarte 1984 [c. 1516]. Livro do Oriente. Além-Mar, Códice Casanatense. Os 
Portugueses na Índia: Viagens, aventuras, conquista. Introd. F. Braudel et al. 
Bertrand & Franco Maria Ricci. 
Damásio, António 2003. Looking for Spinoza: joy, sorrow, and the feeling brain.  
Harcourt. 
Douglas, Mary 2001. In the wilderness: the doctrine of defilement in the book of 
Numbers. Oxford University Press. 
Durkheim, E. and M. Mauss 1963. Primitive classification. Transl. Rodney Needham. 
Chicago University Press. 
Epictetus 2004 [1916]. Discourses. Transl. P.E. Matheson. Dover Publications.  
Feijó, Rui Graça 2008. Língua, nome e identidade numa situação de plurilinguismo 
concorrencial: o caso de Timor-Leste. Etnográfica 12(1): 143-172. 
Finkielkraut, Alain 1997. The wisdom of love. Transl. K. O’Neill and D. Suchoff. 
University of Nebraska Press 
Fortes, Meyer 1970. Kinship and the Axiom of Amity.  Kinship and the social order: the 
legacy of Lewis Henry Morgan, pp. 219-249. Routledge & K. Paul.  
Fry, Peter 2005. A persistência da raça: ensaios antropológicos sobre o Brasil e a África 
Austral. Civilização Brasileira.  
Goffman, Erving 1974. Stigma: notes on the management of spoiled identity. J. 
Aronson. 
Hannerz, Ulf 1991. The Global Ecumene as a Network of Networks. Conceptualizing 
Societies, ed. Adam Kuper, pp. 34-56.  Routledge. 
Jackson, Kenneth David 1990.  Sing without shame: oral traditions in Indo-Portuguese 
Creole verse. J. Benjamins Pub. Co. 
  30 
_________ 1997. Os construtores dos oceanos.  Assírio & Alvim.  
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 1994. Writings on China. Ed. J. Campbell. Open Court. 
Levinas, Emmanuel 1996. Basic Philosophical Writings. Ed. A. Peperzak, S. Critchley 
and R. Bernasconi. Indiana University Press. 
Kroeber, Alfred and Clyde Kluckhohn 1963. Culture: a critical review of concepts and 
definitions. Vintage books. 
Mello e Souza, Laura de 2005 [1986]. O Diabo e a Terra de Santa Cruz: feitiçaria e 
religiosidade popular no Brasil colonial. Companhia das Letras. 
Mintz, Sidney W. 1996. Enduring Substances, Trying Theories: The Caribbean Region 
as Oikoumenê. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.) 2: 289-293. 
Pina-Cabral, João de 1999. O retorno da Laurentina: A simbolização das relações étnicas 
no Moçambique colonial e pós-colonial. Novos Estudos – CEBRAP 53: 85-96. 
______ 2002a. Between China and Europe: Person, Culture and Emotion in Macao. LSE 
Anthropology Series 74. Continuum Books/Berg. 
______ 2002b. Dona Berta’s Garden: Reaching across the colonial boundary. 
Etnográfica 6(1): 77-91. 
______ 2002/3. «Agora podes saber o que é ser pobre»: identificações e diferenciações 
no mundo da lusotopia. Lusotopie 10: 215-224. 
______ 2003. O homem na família. Imprensa de Ciências Sociais. 
______ 2004. Cisma e continuidade em Moçambique. A persistência da história, ed.s 
Clara Carvalho e João de Pina Cabral, pp. 375 -392. Imprensa de Ciências Sociais. 
______ 2005. Crises de Fraternidade: Literatura e Etnicidade no Moçambique Pós-
Colonial. Horizontes Antropológicos 24: 229-253. 
______ 2007. ‘Aromas de Urze e de Lama: Reflexões sobre o gesto etnográfico’. 
Etnográfica 11(1): 191-212. 
______ 2008. Recorrências Antroponímicas Lusófonas. Etnográfica 12(1): 5-16. 
  31 
Pitt-Rivers, Julian 1973. The kith and the kin. The Character of Kinship, ed. Jack 
Goody, pp. 89-105. Cambridge University Press. 
Quine, W. V. 1944 (2nd ed. 1996) 0 sentido da nova lógica. Livraria Martins. 
Reis, Eduardo (1948) Duarte Barbosa: pioneiro revelador dos costumes das Índias: 
relação biográfica. Macau, Imprensa Nacional.  
Sahlins, Marshall 1972. Stone-Age Economics. Tavistock. 
Sousa Santos, Boaventura de 2001. Entre Prospero e Caliban: colonialismo, pós-
colonialismo e interidentidade. Entre Ser e Estar: Raízes, Percursos e Discursos de 
Identidade, eds. Maria Irene Ramalho and António Sousa Ribeiro.  Edições 
Afrontamento. 
Spinoza, Baruch 2006 [1664]. Lettres Sur Le Mal: Correspondance Avec Blyenbergh. 
Gallimard. 
Tolkien, John Ronald Reuel 1995 [1981]. The Letters of J. R. R. Tolkien. Ed. 
Humphrey Carpenter. Harper Collins Publishers.  
Traube, Elizabeth 1986. Cosmology and Social Life: Ritual Exchange among the 
Mambai of East Timor. University of Chicago Press. 
Tsuda Takeyuki 2003. Strangers in the ethnic homeland: Japanese Brazilian return 
migration in transnational perspective. Columbia University Press.  
Valverde, Paulo 2000. Máscara, Morte e Mato em São Tomé, Ed. J. de Pina-Cabral. 
Celta. 
 
